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FEDERAL
7. Based upon the hearings to date and additional data studies by the
committee, it appears that the German route exchange is economically
unsound. In the absence of a satisfactory renegotiation, the Government
should insist upon performance of the basic principles of the agreement
and make full use of the agreed rights to consultation under article 12, or
even termination under article 16 if abuses develop.
8. The Department of State should create appropriate and adequate
facilities to handle the negotiation of air transport agreements and consultations under them. This undertaking by the Department of State should
result in the creation of posts of rank and responsibility commensurate
with those of foreign governments, and qualified Foreign Service officers
should be selected to fill them. With the development of international
aviation, it seems clear that it would be necessary to have several persons,
some able to travel abroad and some to remain in Washington, to cope with
the many negotiations and consultations which will be required in this field.
The subcommittee should continue to function in order (1) to observe
the development by the Government of a procedure for working with the
carriers; (2) to insure that such procedure is satisfactory; and (3) to
watch the formulation of an effective program for enforcement of the Bermuda principles-all in all, so that we can be certain, at this important
transitional stage, of the maintenance of the deserved preeminence of the
United States in world air transport.

JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE AIR ROUTE APPLICATION HEARINGS:
PROCEDURAL STRINGENCY

O

NE of the main functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board' is the certification of new air routes. 2 All applications for routes are given a
hearing before this agency.3 As our national aviation transportation system
expands and progresses, the Board has found itself deluged with a flood of
these applications, yet it is capable of hearing only a limited number. As

a result, there is an ever increasing backlog of applications waiting to be
heard. 4 In order to reduce this accumulation, the development of a more
efficient and streamlined system of hearings is required. However, in
attempting to develop such a system, care must be taken to avoid the possibility of encroachment on the applicant's right to a fair hearing.
This problem of increasing the number of applications considered while,
at the same time, according the applicant a full and fair hearing is particularly vexing when the Board is faced with two or more air route applications
which seek to serve a route capable of supporting only one, thus making the
applications mutually exclusive. 5 A recent case, Delta Air Lines Inc. v.
Civil Aeronautics Board,6 presents this problem.
1 Hereafter referred to as CAB.
2 "No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in
force a certificate issued by the CAB authorizing such carrier to engage in such
transportation.... ." 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 481(a) (1952).
3 ". . . Such application shall be set for public hearing. . .."152 Stat. 987
(1938), 49 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1952).
4 In March, 1954, 650 applications were waiting a hearing. In March, 1955, a
backlog of 850 had accumulated; a net increase of 200. Pfeiffer, Shortening The
Record in CAB Proceedings Through Elimination of Unnecessary And Hazardous
Cross Examination, 22 J. Air. L. & Com. 286 n. 1, 2 (1955).
5 An air route is exclusive (and applications with regard to that route are
mutually exclusive) when there is not sufficient demand for service at the time
the applications are being considered, to support more than one air line. Northwest Airlines v. CAB, 194 F. 2d 339, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
6 228 F. 2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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In that case, Eastern Air Lines applied to the CAB for modification of
its St. Louis-New York Routes. In the same application, additional route
segments of a north-south nature were sought between Cincinnati and
Memphis. Shortly thereafter, Delta Air Lines, basically a north-south
carrier with operations between New Orleans and Detroit, applied for
modifications to its certificate. These modified routes would also include
service between Cincinnati and Memphis. Delta alleged that the traffic
between the two cities would support one carrier only, and that the applications were, therefore, mutually exclusive. Since the applications were of
that nature, Delta requested a consolidation of the hearings.
In response to Delta's request for consolidation, the CAB, without holding a hearing on the question of mutual exclusivity, ruled that, because of
differences in the scope of the two applications, the broad implications of
the two proposals differed so much as to preclude mutual exclusivity. 7 In
addition, the Board felt that consolidation of the applications into one hearing would cause unduly expanded issues and delayed decisions.8 As a result,
the application for consolidation was denied. However, it was indicated that
Delta would be permitted to intervene in the hearing on Eastern's application for the purpose of trying to prove mutual exclusivity.9
Delta's petition for a stay of the proceedings on Eastern's application,
pending review of the Board's denial of consolidation, was granted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, with
respect to those segments of the application alleged to be mutually exclusive.10 The court said that if a claim of mutual exclusivity is not frivolous
or insubstantial, a decision on that issue without a hearing is not satisfactory." Setting forth the types of procedure required when mutual exclusivity is involved, the court held that where mutual exclusivity exists as an
established economic fact, all conflicting applicants must be heard in one
consolidated, comparative hearing.' 2 However, where mutual exclusivity is
merely alleged and not clearly evident, the court felt that a comparative
hearing need not be held initially. The exact procedure in such cases of
alleged mutual exclusivity is left to the discretion of the CAB;18 thus, the
7 The CAB felt that the extent of identical route segments requested in both
applications was so small as to present no considerable conflict of economic interests. 1A CCH Aviation Law Rep. 21,931 (1956).
8 The Board undoubtedly feels that in a case such as this, with only a small
segment of each of the two applications overlapping, a consolidated hearing embracing the entire area of both applications would most likely result in quibbling and
bickering over many points on which there are no real conflicts. Hearing the two
applications separately would eliminate the greater part of this, and thus result
in speedier hearings for both parties.
9 As one whose interests are liable to be offered by the proceedings on Eastern's
application, Delta is entitled to intervene in that proceeding, subject to certain
restrictions. 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.15, 302.14 (1952).
10 Under the impression that the Board was going to dispose of the mutual
exclusivity issue before hearing the merits of Eastern's application, the court
initially refused Delta's request for a stay. Subsequently, upon being apprised of
the Board's true intent, the stay was granted by the court. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, 228 F. 2d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1955).

11 The CAB had rejected the claim of mutual exclusivity without holding a
hearing.
12 The term "comparative hearing" refers to a procedure in which the parties
are heard concurrently, with each accorded the rights to cross examination, oral
argument, and rebuttal.

13 "The agency has a choice of procedure when two applications are alleged
to be mutually exclusive. It may, for example, (1) set for hearing and thereupon

decide the issue of exclusivity as a separate preliminary issue; (2) proceed to a
comparative hearing ...without further ado; or (3) set for hearing and thereafter
decide the merits of the two applications and also the issue of exclusivity." Delta
Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F. 2d 17, (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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Board may, at its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing to determine the
mutual exclusivity issue. However, regardless of the procedure chosen to
resolve this question, no separate hearings on the merits of the respective
applications may be held until the issue is settled. For if the issue is
resolved affirmatively and mutual exclusivity is established, a consolidated,
comparative hearing would be required. Only if mutual exclusivity is found
not to exist may separate hearings be held.
In arriving at the conclusion that mutually exclusive applications, definitely established as such, must be given a comparative hearing, the court
relied on the case of Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC,14 in which it was held
"... that where two bona fide applications are mutually exclusive, the
grant of one without a hearing to both
deprives the loser of the opportunity
which Congress chose to give him."1 5
Subsequently, the CAB disposed of the two applications in accordance
with the holding of the court, 16 even though it disagreed with the D. C.
Circuit's interpretation of the Ashbacker decision. 17 The CAB attributed
a strict construction to the exact language of the holding. The Board's
interpretation would require only a concurrent consideration of all mutually
exclusive applications before a grant is made. The hearing itself would not
have to be of a comparative nature.1 s Thus, there are two conflicting interpretations of the Ashbacker doctrine, each with its own advocates. 19
The variously interpreted 20 holding of the United States Supreme Court
in the Ashbacker case was based on the Court's desire to assure the applicant a full and fair hearing. 21 In Ashbacker the aggrieved party had received a hearing, but it was not held until after the other mutually exclusive
application had been granted. 22 The Court felt that such a procedure
deprived the losing applicant of an effective opportunity to be heard, which
Congress had accorded him. The applicant was entitled to a genuine hear14 326 U.S. 327 (1945). In this case, two parties applied to the FCC for the
same broadcasting frequency. Since two radio stations operating on the same
frequency would have interfered with each other's broadcasts, their applications
were mutually exclusive as an established fact. The FCC granted one application,
and then, for the first time, set the other for hearing, as it was required to do by
statute
5 before the application could be finally denied.
1 Id. at 333.
16 Due to severance of the non-conflicting east-west portions of Eastern's
application, and because of a voluntary withdrawal by Eastern of a large portion
of its previously conflicting segment, the overlapping of the two applications was
so slight, in the eyes of the CAB, as to constitute no substantial conflict of economic
interests. Since the claim of mutual exclusivity was now insubstantial, a consolidated hearing on that issue was no longer required, and the Board moved the court
to vacate the previously imposed stay. 1A CCH Aviation Law Rep. 21,931 (1956).
17 The firmness of the CAB's conviction is evidenced by their statement that
before they accept the view of the D. C. Circuit as the final word, they will pursue
the issue until all avenues for the review of its validity have been exhausted. 1A
CCH Aviation Law Rep. 21,931 (1956).
18 Under the interpretation of the D. C. Court of Appeals, the proceeding would
have to be of a comparative nature.
19 The D. C. Circuit has espoused its interpretation previously with regard to
radio applications. Radio Cincinnati v. FCC. 177 F. 2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see
Kentucky Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 174 F. 2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The CAB's
interpretation is also followed by the 9th Circuit. Western Air Lines v. CAB, 184
F. 2d 545 (9th Cir. 1950).
20Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent in the Ashbacker case, was under the
impression that the majority ruling required all mutually exclusive applications
to be heard concurrently. See Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 335
(1945).
21 Ashbacker Radio Co. was entitled to a hearing by virtue of 48 Stat. 1085
(1934), 47 U.S.C. & 309(b) (1952), which provides a hearing for any applicant
on whom the Commission has not reached a favorable decision.
22 In such a case the applicant finds himself, for all practical purposes, in the
unenviable position of trying to displace an established licensee.
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ing, full and fair. What -he received had the outward appearance of a
hearing, but it was substantially defective in both form and substance.
Once the fairness aspect is recognized as the motivating factor behind
the Ashbacker decision and the flexibility with which such a criterion can
be implemented is perceived, it is no wonder that the 'holding has been
subject to such a variety of interpretations. The Court did not explicitly
spell out what would constitute a fair hearing, probably because what would
constitute a fair hearing in one case might, under another set of circumstances, be a violation of the statutory rights of the parties. 23 As a result,
the procedure appropriate for each case must be individually determined.
Generally, if Congress itself has not set up the precise form to be followed in quasi-judicial hearings before an administrative tribunal, the
procedure is left to the discretion of the administrative agency. So long
as no interest, private or public, is violated by the procedure promulgated
by the agency, the parties are not aggrieved and have no cause for appeal
to a court of review. 24 A fair hearing before an administrative tribunal
requires that each party have the reasonable opportunity to know the claims
of the other party and to contest them.2 5 Moreover, when the hearing concerns parties with opposing interests, this doctrine has been interpreted as
requiring the presence of all parties at all hearings, with the opportunity to
introduce evidence and cross examine witnesses, 26 that is, a trial-type or
adversary proceeding. More specifically, utilization of the trial-type hearing
would seem to be required when a dispute arises with respect to facts which
peculiarly relate to particular parties, their past conduct, or their circum27
stances, business, or property.
When several carriers apply for a route, the economic aspects of which
are such that profitable operation is possible only if use of the route is
limited to one party, the applicant desiring certification must prove that
granting his certificate will best serve the public interest. 28 In so doing
he must vie with the other applicants, all of whom will try to show that
they, themselves, can best serve the public interest. Data will be presented
regarding the particular parties, their past conduct, their circumstances,
business and property. 29 Each applicant for the exclusive route will also
be opposing the application of all other carriers.8 0 This undoubtedly will
23 FCC v. W. J. R., 337 U.S. 265 (1949).

FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1939).
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Swan, 214 F. 2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954).
27 Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity To Be Heard in the Administrative
Process, 51 Yale L. J. 1093 (1942). In this article, Professor Davis discusses a
variety of procedural devices which can be used in administrative hearings. He
concludes that all are practicable and appropriate under the proper circumstances.
He would reserve the trial-type procedure for those instances where a dispute
arises concerning facts which peculiarly relate to particular parties, their past
conduct, or their circumstances, business or property. Under such circumstances,
a trial-type proceeding would seem necessary in order to preserve the right of the
parties to a fair hearing.
28 The public interest requires that the route be served by the carrier who,
among other things, is most fit, willing and able. CAB v. State Airlines, .338 U.S.
572 (1950). See also 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 481(d) (1952).
29 In order to prove fitness, willingness, and ability the carrier-applicant must
show (1) a proper organizational basis for the conduct of air transportation; (2)
a plan for the conduct of the service, made by competent personnel; and (3) adequate financial resources. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 47 F. 2d 152 (D.C. Cir.
1945).
30 Competing applicants for mutually exclusive air routes are allowed to show
that the others are not fit and able to serve as a carrier on that route. The purpose
of this is to give the hearing tribunal the advantage of all available information,
both good and bad, as a basis for its selection of the applicant best qualified to
serve the public interest. CAB v. State Airlines, 338 U.S. 572 (1950).
24
25
26
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lead to disputes with regard to facts
of the particular parties. When this
adversary proceeding is necessary in
for parties whose applications are
hearing, which is advocated by the
proceeding requirement and assures

pertinent to the business property, etc.
type of situation exists, a trial-type or
order to provide a full and fair hearing
mutually exclusive. The comparative
D. C. Circuit, satisfies the adversary
the applicant of a fair hearing.

However, in addition to fairness considerations, there is another factor
to be taken into account when formulating procedures for mutually exclusive air route application hearings. This factor, which is vigorously
advocated by the CAB, is expedition. Since savings of time, money and
effort further the public interest, the Board feels that they are of paramount importance in any disposition made with respect to air route applications. 3 1
The CAB advocates a procedure which, it feels, combines a method for
expeditious handling of applications with one which provides the greatest
fairness which can be achieved. 32 Such a procedure consists of separate
hearings for the two applicants, coupled with intervention rights for interested parties, 33 followed by a concurrent consideration of the findings of
the respective hearing examiners by the Board. In following this procedure, 34 an applicant for a mutually exclusive route would intervene in the
hearing on the merits of the other application for the purpose of crossexamination, introduction of pertinent evidence, and rebuttal, and then
present affirmative arguments with regard to his own application in a
separate hearing.
Such a procedure satisfies the adversary proceeding criterion, and, the
CAB contends, provides a more expeditious hearing than the comparative
proceeding. In a comparative hearing, embracing the entire area of both
applications, quibbling and bickering will most likely occur with respect
to many points concerning which there are no real conflicts. But in the
intervention proceeding, the intervenor is restricted to matters in which he
has an interest. The scope and length of his intervention are limited in
order to avoid delay and complexity. 35 The result is a hearing which accomplishes a saving of much time, money, and effort when compared with that
expended in the comparative proceeding.
However, in utilizing the intervention proceeding, there is the possibility
that when there is a large area of conflict-which would require a correspondingly large scope of intervention-the restrictions and limitations
imposed for the sake of convenience and speed may be exercised to such an
extent that the fullness and fairness of the hearing are curtailed. In such
a case, although the applicant is accorded what appears to be an adversary
31 The CAB must dispose of air route applications in a manner which best
serves the public interest. CAB v. State Airlines, Inc., 338 U.S. 572 (1950).
32 "The (CAB) is . . . cognizant of its duty to accord adequate protection to
private rights in the process of vindicating the public interest, and we have ...
attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the two." 1A CCH Aviation
Law Rep. 21,931 (1956).
33 Under the CAB regulations any person with a property or financial interest
that is to be affected by a proceeding of the Board may intervene in the proceeding
and become a party therein, so long as intervention does not unduly broaden the
issues or delay the proceedings. Furthermore, he may not intervene if the affected
interest has been otherwise represented in the proceeding or is capable of adequate
protection elsewhere. 14 C.F.R. § 302.15 (1952). In those cases where intervention
may cause undue delay or complexity, the scope of intervention is subject to the
discretion of the hearing examiner. 14 C.F.R. § 302.14 (1952).
34 Advocated in 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1951).
35 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b)(7) (1952).
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proceeding, he receives a hearing which, so far as fullness and fairness are
concerned, is inferior to the comparative proceeding. 6 Fairness, however,
may not be sacrificed to expediency,8 7 although some sacrifice of convenience
may be necessary in order to achieve fairness. In hearing applications
with varying degrees of mutual exclusivity, 88 the hearing procedure utilized

may depend on the area of conflict between the parties.
Air route applications whose conflicting portions are merely minute
segments of the overall routes may be handled in intervention proceedings.
Of course, when severance is feasible, the mutually exclusive portions can
be severed for a consolidated hearing and the remaining portions heard in
separate hearings, without intervention. However, if the mutually exclusive portion is so intertwined with the non-conflicting portions of the application that severance is impossible, intervention would satisfy the fairness
criterion. When the conflicting segments are but minute portions of the
applications, any possible loss in fullness and fairness which might result
from holding an intervention proceeding rather than a comparative hearing
is more than offset by the speed with which the applications can be processed and the routes granted. In such a case it would be more unfair to the
applicant to subject his whole application to the quibbling and bickering
of a comparative hearing, with its resultant delay, than to subject a minute
portion of that application to the restrictions and limitations of intervention. Therefore, when the mutually exclusive portions of the application are
so small that it would clearly be a disadvantage to subject the whole application to a comparative hearing, the intervention proceeding is the required
procedure.
As the area of mutual exclusivity increases, the conflicting interests of
the applicants likewise grow. As the scope of intervention widens, the
possibility of a curtailment of fullness and fairness increases. At the
same time, the speed with which the applications can be processed decreases.
Ultimately, in cases where the two applications are mutually exclusive in
their entirety, the intervenor will be intervening on virutally every issue,
and the intervention proceeding will no longer be useful. In addition, due
to the restrictions and limitations which might be imposed upon the intervenor, the hearing he would receive may be neither as full nor as fair as
that received by a participant in the comparative proceeding. Therefore,
in cases of full mutual exclusivity, the comparative hearing is the required
procedure.
Somewhere in between complete mutual exclusivity and minute mutual
exclusivity there are applications whose areas of conflict are of such size
that the minor possibility of loss of fullness and fairness, occasioned by
foregoing the comparative hearing, is still not clearly offset by the diminished advantages of an intervention proceeding at this stage. An area of
conflict of this size represents the procedural transition point.
Therefore, the procedure evolved for an application in which the conflicting area is neither minute nor complete should depend upon which side of
the transition point it falls. Thus, in order to ascertain the procedure for
36 Since the regulations will not allow unrestricted intervention, in order to
assure himself the opportunity to offer evidence and to render cross examination
as a matter of right, the intervenor, himself, may limit and restrict the issuesissues which would be fully discussed and heard in a comparative hearing.
87 -...
the right to such a [fair] hearing is one of the rudiments of fair play
assured to every litigant

. . .

as a minimal requirement. There can be no com-

promise on the footing of convenience or expediency or because of a natural desire
to be rid of harassing delay . . ." Ohio Bell Telephone v. Public Utilities Com-

mission, 301 U.S. 292, 304, (1937).
88 Mutually exclusive air route applications may be identical in their entirety,
but such a situation seldom exists. More frequently, only segments of each overlap
and are mutually exclusive.

JUDICIAL

each individual transition case, an initial determination of the transition
point is required.
This transition point, however, appears to be virtually incapable of exact
determination. Its locus depends upon the comparative weight given to the
factors of fairness and convenience. The weight accorded each factor must
of necessity, be an estimate.8 9 As such, each estimate would tend to be
arbitrary, and, for the same case, it is doubtful whether any two estimates
would be identical. Consequently, there is such a possibility of inaccuracy in
this determination, that it is submitted that a more definite rule should be
established.
Since it is impracticable to ascertain the optimum procedure for each
individual transition case, all cases of mutual exclusivity which qualify as
transition cases should be heard in a proceeding which would provide the
optimum in fairness on an overall basis. The procedure which provides the
optimum in fairness on an overall basis is the comparative hearing. The
possible undue delay'" in processing which may result from using the comparative proceeding, rather than the intervention proceeding, can be mini41
mized by some judicious hatchet-work at the outset of the proceeding.
42
On the other hand, the possible undue loss of fullness and fairness which
may occur from utilization of the intervention proceeding cannot be compensated.
Therefore, except in cases where mutual exclusivity involves what is
clearly only a minute segment of the application, all applications which are
of a mutually exclusive nature should be heard in a comparative proceeding.
In so doing, a workable system achieving the ultimate that is practicable
in expedition and fairness will be provided.
89 The differentials in fairness and convenience which actually prevail could
only be determined by conducting a hearing of each type on the same conflicting
applications and then comparing the results.
40 "Undue delay" is delay in processing which is not compensated by the
increase in fullness and fairness which the comparative hearing provides.
41 Certain route segments in the conflicting applications have no substantial
bearing on the exclusivity issue since these segments are not of a conflicting nature.
These segments are oftentimes severable from those which are of an exclusive
nature and can be considered separately. Furthermore, amendment of applications
by carriers in order to eliminate conflict is possible once the applicants are apprised
by the Board of the exclusivity issue.
42 "Undue loss" is a loss of fullness and fairness which is not compensated by
the increased speed with which the application is processed in an intervention
proceeding.

